The minimal social situation, which arises living systems and subsystems at level of the group, is a two-person game of incomplete information in which the players are ignorant of their interdependence. The win-stay. lose-change principle, based on the law of effect, explains how they nonetheless learn cooperate when the game repeated many times. In this paper the minimal social situation is generalized to groups of arbitrary size with the original two-person game representing a special case. Some theorems derived from the assumption that the players follow the win-stay, losechange principle, and the circumstances that result in joint cooperation are formally characterized. Whether or not an iterated multiperson minimal social situation results in joint cooperation under the win-stay, lose-change principle is shown to depend the configuration of initial choices and the number of times that the group size is evenly divisible by two. Finally, some implications for experimental research are outlined.
T HE MINIMAL social situation, first described by Wyckoff, and Tabory (1956) , is a two-person game of strategy in which the players are oblivious of their strategic interdependence. They are objectively interdependent because their payoffs are by each other's choices, but they are ignorant not only of the payoff structure of the game (as in other games incomplete information) but also of the fact that they are involved in a game of strategy.
The following lifelike interpretation the minimal social situation (Colman, a useful intuitive background. Two commuters travel on the same train every day. They always sit in compartments, both of which are uncomfortably cold. Each compartment has lever marked "heater," but there is no indication as whether it should be turned to the left or right to increase the temperature. What commuters do not know is that there is a fault Requests for reprints should be addressed to Andrew M. Colman, Department of Psychology, University of Leicester, Leicester LEI England, We wish to thank Hilary Craig for her help and encour· agemenL Behavioral Science, Volume 35, 1990 15 in the electrical wiring the train: moving either lever to the left increases the temperature and moving either lever the right decreases the temperature in the adjacent compartment. As a consequence of this, when either of commuters turns the lever to the left or right, the other commuter is rewarded with warmth punished with cold. The commuters cannot influence their own payoffs directly; their comfort discomfort depends entirely on each other's choices, though neither of them realizes this. Thev would nonetheless both benefit if they tu~ned their levers to the left at the beginning of every journey. The following interesting question arises: Can they learn to cooperate in this way in spite of their ignorance of their interdependence and even, perhaps, of each other's existence? If so, then people can learn to cooperate without any deliberate intention or awareness of the need for cooperation and without even knowing that they are involved a social interaction. Sidowski, Wyckoff, and Tabory (1956) and Sidowski (1957) provided experimental evidence that pairs of subjects can-and generally do-learn to cooperate in the minimal social situation, and this finding been replicated many times (Kelley, Thibaut, Radloff & Mundy, 1962; COOPERATION WITHOUT AWARENESS 117 and all subsequent trials. We can represent the outcomes on successive trials by a sequence of ordered pairs corresponding to the row and column players' choices respectively:
(0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), ....
If both players choose 1 on the first trial, then both receive negative payoffs which cause them to switch to ° on the second trial, and these ° choices are repeated on all subsequent trials:
(1, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), ....
If one player initially chooses ° and the other chooses 1, then the O-chooser receives a negative payoff and therefore switches to 1 on the second trial, and the I-chooser receives a positive payoff and therefore sticks to 1 on the second trial. On the second trial, therefore, both players will It is clear from this analysis that players who follow the win-stay, lose-change principle learn to cooperate-to choose mutually rewarding strategies-by the third trial at the latest, and continue to cooperate indefinitely after that.
Experimental evidence shows, however, that people do not generally follow the winstay, lose-change principle rigidly (Rabinowitz, Kelley & Rosenblatt, 1966; Burnstein, 1969; Arickx & Van Avermaet, 1981; Colman, 1982b) . In general, cooperative ° choices begin to exceed chance frequency after a few trials and continue to increase in frequency; after 100 trials about 75% of choices are cooperative. According to the win-stay, lose-change principle, of course, 100% cooperation should occur after three trials. This means that players in the minimal social situation do not obey the law of effect strictly. But cooperative behavior does tend to evolve and, in the light of overwhelming evidence from other branches of psychology, it seems reasonable to assume that people are governed to a large extent by the law of effect and thereBehavioral Science, Volume 35, 1990 fore that they tend to follow the win-stay, lose-change principle. This implies that the probability of a player's choice on trial t being repeated on trial t + 1 increases if the player is rewarded and decreases if the player is punished on trial t (Arickx & Van Avermaet, 1981) .
In the sections that follow, we propose to generalize the minimal social situation to groups of arbitrary size. We shall then investigate the consequences of the win -stay, lose-change principle in these n-person games and characterize the circumstances that result in joint cooperation.
GENERALIZATION TO N-PERSON GROUPS Preliminary formalization
The n-person minimal social situation is a game involving n ~ 2 players, each of whom has a uniquely designated predecessor and successor. The game can be represented by a cyclic graph of valency 2. It is useful to imagine the n players sitting round a table, so that l's predecessor is n and n's successor is 1. Each player has a choice of two strategies, ° and 1, so the choices of the n players on a specified trial can be represented by an n-vector of zeros and ones which we call a configuration. If a player chooses 0, then that player's successor receives a positive payoff, and if a player chooses 1, then that player's successor receives a negative payoff. According to the win-stay, lose-change principle, any player who receives a positive payoff will repeat the same strategy choice on the following trial, and any player who receives a negative payoff will switch strategies on the following trial. For any configuration, therefore, there is a unique configuration that follows it according to the win-stay, lose-change principle. A configuration con-, sisting entirely of zeros will be repeated on all subsequent trials. Any configuration that leads ultimately to this zero configuration is called cooperative. The analysis in the previous section shows that in the twoperson minimal social situation, which is merely a special case of the general n-person game, all configurations are cooperative.
COLEMAN, COLMAN, AND THOMAS
Some typical configurations in a six-person minimal social situation will illustrate these ideas. In this game, the configuration (1,0, 1,0, 1, 0) is followed on the next trial by (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), and then by (0, 0, 0, 0, 0,0); the initial configuration (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) is therefore cooperative. On the other hand, the configuration (1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) generates the following sequence: (1, 0, 1, 0,0,0), (1, 1, 1, 1,0,0), (1,0,0, 0,1, 0) , (1,  1, 0, 0, 1, 1), (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1, 1, 1,  1), (1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) , and the initial configuration is repeated. Such a configuration will evidently cycle for ever, never reaching (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) , which shows that the initial configuration is noncooperative.
An arbitrary configuration in an n-person minimal social situation can be represented by the vector where X i E \0, 11. The numbers ° and 1 can be regarded as elements of the field GF(2) of integers modulo 2. In the configuration (y" .. . , Yn) immediately following (Xl , ... , xn), since ° + ° = 1 + 1 = 0, and 1
Yi= .
where the subscripts are reduced modulo n. Therefore,
The configuration immediately following (Xl, . • . , xn) is therefore obtained by applying the linear transformation
where x' denotes the transpose of the row vector x. The transformation matrix is an n-square matrix T = [ti j 1 in which
The general form of the transformation matrix is shown in Table 1 . We have therefore proved that if the num-ber of players is odd, joint cooperation is achieved only if all players make the same initial choice, and it results after one trial at most.
Theorem 3. If j = 2 P , P E Z+ (where Z+ is the set of nonnegative integers), then where 
.. " and therefore, since e is a positive integer, that
Since em == h (mod n), Xi = Xi+k for all i (mod n), which shows that X E her Tk. We have therefore proved that her Tm is a subset of her T\ and hence, since h < m, that her Tk = her Tm, as required.
This theorem shows that we can characterize the cooperative configurations in an n-person minimal social situation as follows. If n is odd, then the cooperative configurations are (Xl, ... , xn) such that Xi= Xi+l for all i (mod n). If n is even, then if h is the highest power of 2 that divides n evenly, then the cooperative configurations are (Xl, ... , xn) such that Xi = Xi+k for all i (mod n).
The proof also implies that, in an nperson minimal social situation, if h is the highest power of 2 that divides n evenly, the first h players may choose arbitrarily, but the choices of the remaining players 120 COLEMAN, COLMAN, AND THOMAS are determined for the configuration to be cooperative. It follows that the number of cooperative initial configurations is 2k.
DISCUSSION
An abstract theory, if it is to be useful, should do two things. First, it should explain existing empirical data. Second, it should provide conclusions whose scope extends beyond existing data but can be empirically tested. The fo~mal s.ys~em dev~l oped in this paper explams e.xI~tmg data m a trivial sense, inasmuch as It mcorporates the theory and experimental findings related to the two-person minimal social situation as a special case.
The win-stay, lose-change principle, which has been used to explain the evolution of cooperation in the two-person game, is derived from the law of effect, originally formulated by Thorndike (1911) as follows: "Responses ... which are accompanied or closely followed by satisfaction [are] more firmly connected with the situation ... ; those which are accompanied or closely followed by discomfort ... have their connections with the situation weakened" (p. 244). (Thorndike later "repealed" the seco.nd part, which is sometimes called the negative law of effect.) Many behaviorist psychologists, including Skinner (1966 Skinner ( , 1984 , regard the law of effect as a behavioral parallel of natural selection in which only the most successful responses in an organism's behavioral repertoire survive while the unsuccessful responses become extinct. Several decades of psychological research have provided abundant corroboration of the law of effect in a wide variety of situations. It would be most surprising if it were found not to apply in the minimal social situation. It is worth pointing out, however, that the win-stay, lose-change principle is an idealized version of the law of effect in which responses that are rewarded are invariably repeated and those that are punished are never repeated on the following trial-the principle, unlike the law of effect, is deterministic and noncumulative. It is clear, however, that the broad outline of the theory presented in this paper would remain valid if a stochastic version of the win-stay, lose-change principle based on probabilistic learning theory were substituted.
The formal results certainly extend beyond the scope of existing empirical data. Many of the predictions that can be derived from the analysis are counterintuitive but nevertheless easily testable. Among the interesting predictions that should be tested are the following. First, although the frequency of rewarding choices and joint cooperation tends to increase in the two-person minimal social situation, the theory predicts no such increase in odd-sized groups. Second, whenever the number of players is even but not a power of two, configurations that are cooperative according to the theory should progress toward joint cooperation more frequently than noncooperative configurations. Third, multiperson groups in which the number of players is a power of two should behave like players in the two-person minimal social situation: irrespective of the choices made on the first trial, there should be steady progress toward joint cooperation. Fourth, the frequency of rewarding choices and joint cooperation should correlate with the number of cooperative initial configurations determined by the theory. If any of these predictions turns out to be wrong, then the assumptions of the theory will have to be modified.
